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CASE COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CouNsm ASSIGNED To REPRESENT
INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANT IN FEDERAL COURT AWARDED
COMPENSATION
After representing an indigent criminal defendant pursuant to ap-
pointment by a federal district court, petitioner, at the suggestion of the
court, moved to recover reasonable compensation from the Government.'
The court ordered payment of thirty-five dollars an hour, basing the award
on the fifth amendment's prohibition against taking property without just
compensation. Dillon v. United States, 230 F. Supp. 487 (D. Ore. 1964).
In the past attorneys appointed to represent indigent defendants in
federal criminal prosecutions have not been awarded compensation for
services 2 and neither the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, providing
for appointment of counsel,3 nor the statute providing for assignment of
counsel in capital cases 4 provide for compensation. 5  However, Congress
recently has passed the Criminal Justice Act of 1964,6 which provides in
part:
PAYMENT FOR REPRESENTATION.-An attorney appointed
pursuant to this section, or a bar association or legal aid agency
which made an attorney available for appointment, shall . . .
be compensated at a rate not exceeding $15 per hour for time
1 Dillon, the indigent criminal defendant, was resentenced in proceedings under
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958).
2 Both Congress and the courts have denied compensation. FELumsA, THE DE-
FENDANT'S RIGHTS 125 (1958); see Nabb v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 173 (1864);
cf. United States v. Fore, 38 F. Supp. 142 (S.D. Cal. 1941).
3 FED. R. CRim. P. 44:
If the defendant appears in court without counsel, the court shall advise
him of his right to counsel and assign counsel to represent him at every
stage of the proceeding unless he elects to proceed without counsel or is
able to obtain counsel.
See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1958) (proceedings in forma pauperis).
4 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1958).
5An attorney's out-of-pocket expenses present a different problem, since Congress
has expressly provided for their allowance in certain situations. Bell, Criminal Indi-
gent Defense in the Federal Courts, 37 Los ANGELES B. BULL. 297-98 (1962). This
expense provision was directed toward protecting the indigent defendant and not
toward reimbursing his attorney. See 28 U.S.C. § 753(f) (1958) (expenses of tran-
scripts) ; 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1958) (printing the record on appeal) ; FED. R. CRIM. P.
15(c) (travel and subsistence when taking depositions); FED. R. CiuM. P. 17(b)
(serving subpoenas). In United States v. Germany, 32 F.R.D. 343 (M.D. Ala.
1963), the court went beyond these bounds and held that it was part of defendant's
right to effective representation to have the attorney reimbursed for reasonable and
necessary expenses incurred in interviewing a witness. Id. at 345. In a later opinion
in the same case, the court specifically disclaimed any intention of allowing reasonable
attorney's fees by the payments authorized. United States v. Germany, 32 F.R.D.
421, 423-24 (M.D. Ala. 1963).
s For a discussion of similar bills in prior Congresses, see Celler, Federal Legis-
lative Proposals To Supply Paid Counsel to Indigent Persons Accused of Crime,
45 MINN. L. REv. 697 (1961).
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expended in court or before a United States commissioner, and
$10 per hour for time reasonably expended out of court, and shall
be reimbursed for expenses reasonably incurred. . . . [T]he
compensation . . . shall not exceed $500 in a case in which one
or more felonies are charged, and $300 in a case in which only
misdemeanors are charged. In extraordinary circumstances, pay-
ment in excess of the limits stated herein may be made if the
district court certifies that such payment is necessary to provide
fair compensation for protracted representation . . ..
Although the present case was decided before this compensation
statute was enacted, the court's rationale could nullify its effect. The
standard of compensation provided for a taking of property under the
fifth amendment is one of market value.8 This value would vary, depend-
ing on the individual attributes of each attorney,9 and for most would
probably exceed the amount provided under the act.10 Therefore, it is
necessary to examine carefully the legal basis for the present decision with
a view towards its potential effect on the administration of the Criminal
Justice Act.
The present court held that attorneys' services were "property," en-
titling the owner to just compensation, since the fifth amendment bars the
"Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a
whole."" Under the sixth amendment the Government has an obliga-
tion to provide defense counsel in criminal cases.' 2  Since criminal prosecu-
7Criminal Justice Act of 1964, §2(d), 78 Stat. 552, 553 (1964). This section
also provides: "For representation . . . in an appellate court, the compensation to
be paid . . . shall in no event exceed $500 in a felony case and $300 in a case
involving only misdemeanors." Ibid. Furthermore, reasonable compensation as de-
termined by a court is provided for "investigative, expert, or other services necessary
to an adequate defense . . . ." Ibid.
s United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1943) ; United States v. 658.59
Acres of Land, 224 F. Supp. 645, 646 (W.D. Pa. 1963); 1 ORGFL, VALUATION UNDER
THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 17 (2d ed. 1953).
Market value is the price at which a willing seller would sell to a willing buyer,
when neither is under compulsion to enter the transaction. Olsen v. United States,
292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934) ; Cade v. United States, 213 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1954).
9 The sentence in § 2(d) of the Criminal Justice Act providing for extra pay-
ments in extraordinary circumstances probably does not mean that the hourly rates
may be increased, but rather that for protracted litigation the total compensation may
be increased above the $500 statutory maximum.
10 See, e.g., PHILADELPHIA BAR Ass'x, MINIMUM FEE SCHEDULE (1959).
" Instant case at 493 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49
(1960)); accord, United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 266 (1939). Juris-
diction of the court to hear the present action is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (2)
(1958).
12 johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). There is no sixth amendment right to
counsel in proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1958), since such motions are considered
in the nature of civil suits. E.g., Baker v. United States, 334 F.2d 444, 447 (8th Cir.
1964). Request for counsel in these proceedings is addressed to the sound discretion
of the court. E.g., ibid.; Ellis v. United States, 313 F.2d 848, 850 (7th Cir. 1963).
Such request will generally be granted if a hearing on the motion is required as in
the instant case. See, e.g., United States v. Paglia, 190 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1951);
Green v. United States, 158 F. Supp. 804, 808 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 256 F.2d 483 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 854 (1958).
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tions are conducted for benefit of the public, the counsel requirement can
be said to result in employing an attorney's services for a public advantage
or public use.' 3
The question whether anything is "taken" from an attorney appointed
to defend an indigent turns on whether he is in any way compelled to serve.
One direct source of compulsion is the courts. The Supreme Court in
Powell v. Alabama 14 imposed a duty on the court to appoint counsel if
requested,15 and another court has stated that "the lawyer must . . . give
of his time and use his skill and knowledge . . when directed to
defend an indigent.
While formal contempt sanctions apparently have never been used,
there is a psychological compulsion upon an attorney to serve. Because
of an attorney's close dependence upon the courts, both on a formal
and an informal basis, he is not likely to refuse the request of a judge
before whom he regularly appears.17 He may often feel that refusing
might result in the judge being less willing to do normal favors which are
within a judge's discretion, such as moving a trial date a few days or
granting a continuance. Thus, even though the attorney formally "con-
sents" to serve, this should not be taken to manifest a subjective willing-
ness to serve.' s
However, the lawyer has an ethical obligation to society through the
legal system,19 which negates the assertion that appointhent amounts to a
13 Property taken for a "public use" includes property needed by a government
official in the performance of his public duties. E.g., United States v. Certain Lands,
78 F.2d 684, 687 (6th Cir. 1935) ; United States v. 209.25 Acres of Land, 108 F. Supp.
454, 460 (W.D. Ark. 1952) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds sub noma. United States
v. Willis, 211 F.2d 1 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1015 (1954).
14 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) : "The duty of the trial court to appoint counsel . . .
is clear . . . and its power to do so, even in the absence of a statute, can not be
questioned." The Court went on to imply that this power stemmed from the status
of attorneys as officers of the court which binds them to render service to the indigent
criminal. Ibid.
15 See, e.g., United States v. Haug, 21 F.R.D. 22, 27 (N.D. Ohio 1957). See also
28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1958).
'6 Bibb County v. Hancock, 211 Ga. 429, 438, 86 S.E.2d 511, 518 (1955). (Em-
phasis added.) The courts have placed emphasis upon the compelling nature of the
attorney's duty to serve. In a civil case where defendant asked for appointed counsel
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1958), the court stated that, while they could only
"request" counsel to serve in a civil matter, in a criminal action they would "assign"
counsel who would have to serve. Reid v. Charney, 235 F.2d 47 (6th Cir. 1956)
(per curiam) (dictum) ; see Moss v. Thomas,. 299 F.2d 729, 730 (6th Cir. 1962).
3. There is some question as to whether the services of the attorney in the instant
case were rendered voluntarily. Compare instant case at 495 ("I have called you
• . . to appoint you counsel . . . and direct you to represent Dillon . .
with id. at 496 ("if I have the power to enlist your services, voluntarily, albeit . .
(Emphasis added.)
18 Compare the problem of "consent" in the context of search and seizure. See
Note, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 260-61 (1964).
19Weatherby v. Pittman, 24 Ga. App. 452, 101 S.E. 131 (1919); see Rowe v.
Yuba County, 17 Cal. 61, 63 (1860) (counsel not at liberty to reject appointments
which form part of general duty) ; David, Institutional or Private Counsel: A Judge's
View of the Public Defender System, 45 MINi.. L. REv. 753, 757 (1961).
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"governmental taking." This obligation arises not only from the state's
licensing power, but also from the special privileges granted to attorneys.2
As an officer of the court,21 an attorney has the unique privilege of setting
the judicial processes in motion on behalf of a client.?2  Historically, this
privilege has involved the corresponding duty to serve those financially
unable to obtain counsel. 3  As expressed by the Canons of Professional
Ethics: "A lawyer assigned as counsel for an indigent prisoner ought not
ask to be excused for any trivial reason, and should always exert his best
efforts in his behalf." 2 4 By his admission to the bar, the attorney accepts
an implied moral and ethical qualification on his right to practice-that
he defend the indigent.25  Thus the theory behind the just compensation
clause of the fifth amendment-not compelling one group to bear the
burdens of the public at large without compensation-has no application to
the present situation.
"Property" under the just compensation clause has traditionally re-
ferred to a corporeal object capable of being subject to ownership,28 or
the rights in such object,2 7 and has also been expanded to include certain
contract rights?.8  But this term has never been interpreted to include the
services of an individual; 29 indeed, the present court's analogy 3 0 from
20 Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 553, 133 P.2d 325, 327 (1943) ; see, e.g.,
In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 96, 54 N.E. 646, 653 (1899); Johnston v. Lewis & Clarke
County, 2 Mont. 159 (1874). But see Johnson v. Whiteside County, 110 Ill. 22(1884).
S1 E.g., Arkansas County v. Freeman, 31 Ark. 266 (1876); Wayne County v.
Waller, 90 Pa. 99, 104 (1879).
2 Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 558, 133 P.2d 325, 330 (1943).
23 Chief Justice Hale expressed this duty: "'Although serjeants have a monopoly
of practice in the Common Pleas, they have a right to practice, and do practice, at
this bar; and if we were to assign one of them as counsel, and he was to refuse to
act, we should make bold to commit him to prison."' 1 CoOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS 700 n.4 (8th ed. 1927). (Emphasis added.)
"'Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.' . . . [An
attorney is] received into that ancient fellowship for something more than private
gain." People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470-71, 162 N.E. 487, 489 (1928)
(Cardozo, C.J.).24 ABA CANON oF PROFESSIONAL ETHIcs 4.
"It is part of the lawyer's oath that he 'will never reject, from any consideration
personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any man's
cause for lucre or malice." BLAusTEmi & PORTER, THE AMERICAN LAWYER 247
(1954).25 See Wayne County v. Waller, 90 Pa. 99 (1879) ; cf. People ex rel. Karlin v.
Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928).
282 NicaoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN §5.1[1] (3d ed. 1963); see Blake v. United
States, 181 F. Supp. 584, 587 (E.D. Va. 1960), aff'd, 295 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1961);
Central Eureka Mining Co. v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 281, 289 (Ct. Cl. 1956),
rev'd on other grounds, 357 U.S. 155 (1958).
27 See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (right in peaceful enjoy-
ment of land) ; United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945) (lease-
hold); United States v. Finn, 127 F. Supp. 158 (S.D. Cal. 1954), modified and aff'd,
239 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1956).28 johnson v. United States, 79 F. Supp. 208 (Ct Cl. 1948) ; see Brooks-Scanlon
Corp. v. United States, 265 U.S. 106, 119-24 (1924). Compare Omnia Commercial Co.
v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923).
2 See 1 NIcHoLs, op. cit. supra note 26, at § 1.4[3]. Services have often been
compensated, not because of any constitutional mandate, but as a matter of public
policy. Ibid.30 Instant case at 491.
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two patent cases 3 1 seems inapposite, since those cases did not involve fifth
amendment rights.
While an attorney's franchise to practice in a state,3 2 as well as the
rights of others to perform services,-a are protected by the due process
clause from governmental abuse and arbitrary discrimination, the standard
for awarding damages under the due process clause is the same as that
under the just compensation clause 3 4  Thus, when a sovereign takes
property, even if arbitrarily, the only right to a money recovery rests on
the just compensation clause.
The present court also argued that the attorney has a right to recover
because of an implied contract. Since there is no historical basis for a
reasonable expectation of compensation,35 such belief by the attorney in
the present case could only come from the judge's statement when he
appointed the attorney that he had "inherent power to establish a just
obligation on the part of the government for compensation . . . .. 6
To buttress its statement that there is an implied contract, the present
court 37 used the two patent cases which were decided on the ground that
the Government, by asking the inventor to exhibit his work, had implied
that it would pay for the use of the patents3 8 However, in these cases
the war department board, which eventually took the patented ideas for
its own use, had express authority to investigate the matter and purchase
certain patents for its use. Here the judge had no express authority to
establish a governmental obligation, and "no officer of the Government has
the power to bind the United States in the absence of congressional
authority".3 9 In addition there is no inherent judicial power to contract
for the Government, 40 and the statute providing for appointment of counsel
cannot be said to furnish an implied contract that the Government will
31 United States v. Berdan Fire-Arms Mfg. Co., 156 U.S. 552 (1895); United
States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262 (1888).
32 See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Board of
Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
33 Smith v. Texas, 233 U.S. 630 (1914).
34 See Hessel v. A. Smith & Co., 15 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. IIl. 1936) ; 1 NICHOLS,
op. cit. supra note 26, at § 4.8: "[E]ven though the constitutional prohibition against
the taking of property without due process of law does not specify or regulate com-
pensation, just compensation . . . is an essential element of due process . ...
85 See text accompanying note 2 supra.
36 Instant case at 496.
37Id. at 491.
38United States v. Berdan Fire-Arms Mfg. Co., 156 U.S. 552 (1895); United
States v. Palmer, 128 U.S. 262 (1888).
39 Byrne Organization, Inc. v. United States, 287 F.2d 582, 586 (Ct. Cl. 1961).
Even though the judge and the attorney may have thought some inherent power
existed, "anyone entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk of
having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for the Government stays
within the bounds of his authority." Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S.
380, 384 (1947).
4OWayne County v. Waller, 90 Pa. 99 (1879) (attorney claimed implied juris-
diction of court to compensate him in order to promote justice) ; County of Dane v.
Smith, 13 Wis. 585, 587-88 (1861) (dictum) (clarifying Carpenter v. Dane County,
9 Wis. 274 (1859)).
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pay.41 Thus judicial power to award compensation must be based on the
court's right to award damages under the just compensation clause.
The present case most probably arose only because the judge wanted
to "remedy" the "intolerable burden upon the legal profession" 42 of pro-
viding free counsel for those unable to pay. Compensation lessens the
financial strain on attorneys trying to build a practice,43 as well as on those
whose practice has already been established." Compensation also results
in more effective counsel, because it provides the attorney with monetary
incentive, as well as some of the necessary investigative resources. Finally,
compensation justifies taking more experienced attorneys from other work
and thus enhances the possibility that such attorneys will be appointed
in the more difficult criminal cases.43 The Criminal Justice Act appears
to have met these problems, at least to the extent of providing a reasonable
rate of compensation. While this rate may not equal the market-value
standard of the fifth amendment, compensation under the latter standard
can be attained only by distorting the just compensation rationale.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-UsE OF INDIGENT DEFENDANTS IN
PoncE LiNEuPs HELDDENIAL OF EQUAL PROTECTION WITH AN
AsSIsT FRoM DUE PRoCEss
Plaintiffs were awaiting trial on state criminal charges in the Phila-
delphia Detention Center for want of bail. They were ordered by the
police to participate in a lineup for possible identification as perpetrators
of unsolved crimes similar to those they were accused of committing.
The plaintiffs sought and obtained a preliminary injunction against en-
forcement of the order from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The court found that a defendant
released on bail could not be subjected to an investigatory lineup unless
he voluntarily cooperated or the police were able to obtain "sufficient
41 See Nabb v. United States, 1 Ct. Cl. 173 (1864); cf. People ex rel. Wheldon
v. Board of Supervisors, 192 App. Div. 705, 183 N.Y. Supp. 438 (1920) (attorney
claimed rule requiring appointment of counsel entitled him to compensation). But cf.
Hall v. Washington County, 2 Greene 473 (Iowa 1850). See also Webb v. Baird,
6 Ind. 13 (1854) (court provided compensation under a state constitution which
required just compensation for the taking of services).
4 2 Instant case at 495.
43 Hearings on S. 63 and S. 1057 Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
88th Cong., 1st Sess. 77-78 (1963). Whitney North Seymour, Director of the New
York Legal Aid Society, read this letter from a young lawyer: "'I had spent approxi-
mately $100, which was advanced to me by my wife from her bank-account (saved
from schoolteaching days) . . . 150 hours would be a conservative estimate (of
time spent) . . . ."' Id. at 78. See also Ervin, Uncompensated Counsel: They
Do Not Meet the Constitutional Mandate, 49 A.B.A.J. 435, 436 (1963).
44 See Hearings on S. 63 and S. 1057, supra note 43, at 98-99; Ervin, supra note
43, at 436.
45 See Hearings on S. 63 and S. 1057, supra note 43, at 101-02.
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evidence to constitute probable cause for his arrest on the new charge." 1
The court, therefore, held that the forced participation of the jailed
defendants would constitute an invidious discrimination depriving them
of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amend-
ment. Butler v. Crunlish, 229 F. Supp. 565 (E.D. Pa. 1964) .2
The position of the jailed defendant awaiting trial is generally no
better than that of a convicted prisoner.3 His very incarceration places
him at a distinct disadvantage compared with the bailed defendant, for
he is subject "to all those restraints which are an essential part of the
management of a prison." 4 He does not have free access to the mails,
the phone, his friends, or even his attorney.5 His compelled absence from
work necessarily imperils his job and consequently renders him less able
to establish a favorable presentencing record. If convicted the jailed
defendant is more apt to be imprisoned rather than given a suspended
sentence. Indeed he is more frequently convicted than his bailed counter-
part.
6
While the Supreme Court, in recent years, has expressed increasing
concern with the plight of the indigent defendant during trial 7 and the
appellate process,8 the full Court has not yet considered the relationship
of indigency to the bail system. Instead it has merely reaffirmed bail's
prominent position among basic constitutional rights and indicated that
bail may not be denied arbitrarily.9 The present decision does not ex-
plicitly question the constitutionality of a bail system based upon a man's
1 Instant case at 567.
2 At the time of the hearing on the permanent injunction, the plaintiffs were no
longer in custody. Therefore, the court terminated the preliminary injunction and
denied a final injunction, but retained jurisdiction with leave for the plaintiffs to file
an amended complaint in the event they were returned to custody and threatened
with a compulsory police lineup. Butler v. Crumlish, 237 F. Supp. 58 (E.D. Pa.
1964).
3 At times jailed defendants "are confined pending trial under conditions which
are more oppressive and restrictive than those applied to convicted and sentenced
felons." Foote, Foreword: Comment on the New York Bail Study, 106 U. PA. L.
REV. 685, 689 (1958).
4 Instant case at 566.
5 For a discussion of the disadvantages facing the jailed defendant, see generally
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL's CommriTEE ON POVERTY AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF
FEDERAL CRimINAL JUsTIcE, REPORT 68-72 (1963); Wald, Pretrial Detention and
Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical Study, Foreword, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 631 (1964);
Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 641-46, 649-50 (1964);
Foote, Foreword: Comment on the New York Bail Study, 106 U. PA. L. REV. 685
(1958) ; Note, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA.
L. REv. 693, 722-29 (1958) ; Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration
of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1049-59 (1954).
6Rankin, supra note 5, at 642-43, 649-50; Note, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 693, 726-27
(1958) ; Note, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1049-54 (1954).
7 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
8 See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Coppedge v. United
States, 369 U.S. 438 (1962) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
9 See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) ; cf. Pannell v. United States, 320 F.2d
698 (D.C. Cir. 1963). Compare Bandy v. United States, 82 Sup. Ct. 11 (Douglas,
Circuit Justice, 1961); Bandy v. United States, 81 Sup. Ct. 197 (Douglas, Circuit
Justice, 1960). See generally Note, Bail: An Ancient Practice Reexamined, 70
YALE: L.J. 966 (1961); Comment, 51 Micir. L. REv. 389 (1953).
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financial standing.' 0 Nor does it discredit the lineup itself, which has
repeatedly been held to be a legitimate police practice; "' it merely elimi-
nates one of the numerous inequalities to which the jailed defendant is
exposed.
The court rested its decision on the following reasoning: bailed defend-
ants cannot constitutionally be forced to participate in lineups unless the
police have probable cause to arrest them for the crimes for which the
lineups are held; thus defendants who cannot raise bail would be denied
equal protection of the laws if police could force them into an investigatory
lineup without probable cause. The basis of the premise was that forcing
the bailed defendant to participate in a lineup would constitute an arrest,
which would violate the due process clause if probable cause was lacking.
This rationale seems to be a compromise between two more conventional
approaches to the same result: (1) forcing the jailed defendant into a
lineup is itself a violation of due process; (2) any significant disparity in
treatment between jailed and bailed persons beyond that absolutely neces-
sary for the maintenance of the prison violates equal protection. The court
did not consider the first approach; it apparently rejected the latter.1
2
The absence of an explicit conclusion on the first point is conspicuous
because the analogy of the present case to an arrest without probable cause
is almost self-evident, and the courts are generally reluctant to utilize the
equal protection clause when there is an available alternative.' 3 The
Supreme Court decisions holding the fourth amendment binding upon the
Io The court, however, was not insensitive to the problem of bail and the indigent:
"The theoretical equality of the right to bail when all are not financially equal thus
has become in reality a deep and wounding social inequality, increasingly oppressive
to the poor and the vagrant." Instant case at 568. See also Pannell v. United States,
320 F.2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (separate opinion of Bazelon, C.J.).
11 See, e.g., Caldwell v. United States, 338 F.2d 385 (8th Cir. 1964); United
States v. Vita, 294 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1961) ; State v. King, 84 NJ. Super. 297, 201
A.2d 758 (App. Div. 1964).
12 See text accompanying notes 28-30 infra.
13 It was not until Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), that the Supreme Court
first gave extended consideration to the relationship of the equal protection clause to
the indigent in criminal procedure. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process,
113 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 19 n.20 (1964). Griffln has been the vehicle for an extensive
re-examination of the indigent's plight under our system. See id. at 18-19; Note,
Equal Protection and the Indigent Defendant: Griffin and Its Progeny, 16 STAN. L.
REv. 394 (1964). The relationship between the constitutional requirements of due
process and equal protection is extremely close. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497 (1954). Indeed, the Court's judgment in Griffin rested upon both the due process
and equal protection clauses, but Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion seems
to reject the due process argument, and later cases dealing with appellate review have
stressed equal protection. E.g., Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
Mr. Justice Holmes once called the equal protection clause "the usual last resort
of constitutional arguments . . . ." Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927). Although
the present Supreme Court has not been nearly so reluctant to invoke the equal
protection clause as its predecessors, see Kurland, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and
Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of the Government," The
Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARv. L. REv. 143-62 (1964), it still seems to prefer
to rely on other constitutional commands whenever possible. See Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Compare
Douglas v. California, supra.
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states have been primarily in the area of search and seizure.1 4 While the
Court has not established a uniform standard of arrest,' 5 recent opinions
indicate that the Constitution does place limits upon a state's power to
arrest.' 6 The fourth amendment's strict insistence upon probable cause
stems from the belief that the state should not deprive an individual of
his freedom or invade his privacy unless "the facts and circumstances
known to the officer warrant a prudent man in believing that the offense
has been committed [by the person suspected] .... , 17
To give the police greater leeway in the investigation of a jailed
defendant seems inconsistent with an accusatorial system which places the
entire burden in the criminal process upon the state.'8 It can be argued
forcefully that one of the reasons for the requirement of probable cause
to arrest is a belief that the state should muster a certain quantum of
evidence before obligating a citizen to assist in his own prosecution even
by the relatively passive "actions" of submitting to a lineup or finger-
printing.'9 In this respect the practice condemned in the present case
is very similar to the use of dragnet arrests for investigatory purposes,
which is not a sanctioned method of police investigation: 20
14 See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) ; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23
(1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28
(1949) (dictum).
5 "Mapp . . . established no assumption by this Court of supervisory authority
over state courts . . . and, consequently, it implied no total obliteration of state laws
relating to arrests and searches in favor of federal law." Ker v. California, supra
note 14, at 31.
' 6 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 112 n.3 (1964); see Ker v. California, 374
U.S. 23 (1963) ; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963) ; Broeder, Wong
Sut v. United States: A Study in Faith and Hope, 42 NEB. L. Rxv. 483, 557-64 (1963).
While evidence sufficient to establish guilt is not necessary in order to make an
arrest, the fourth amendment does require probable cause. Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98 (1959). Since most arrests are made without a warrant, the initial
decision is generally made by the police alone. Even where a warrant is sought,
there is substantial evidence that the judicial officer merely rubber stamps the police
decision. See Barrett Police Practices and the Law-From Arrest to Release or
Charge, 50 CALiF. L. REv. 11, 21 (1962). See generally Foote, Law and Police
Practice Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 16 (1957); Lafave,
Detention for Investigation by the Police: An Analysis of Current Practices, 1962
WAsr. U.L.Q. 331. However, in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), the Court
expressed a willingness to go beyond the face of an otherwise valid search warrant
and determine for itself if the magistrate was correctly performing his function.
The Court intimated that it would still be far more reluctant to overturn a prior
judicial determination of probable cause, as evidenced by the issuance of a search
warrant, than a search where no warrant had been issued. Id. at 111.
17 Henry v. United States, supra note 16, at 102; accord, Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1949) ; Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d
304, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 910 (1963).
18 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Culombe v. Connecticut,
367 U.S. 568 (1961) ; Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) ; Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of
Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE LJ. 1149 (1960).
19 See Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957); Gatlin v. United
States, 326 U.S. 666 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ; Bynum v. United States, 262 F.2d 465 (D.C.
Cir. 1958).
2 0 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481 n.9 (1963); cf. Marron v.
United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927).
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The round-up or dragnet arrest, the arrest on suspicion, for
questioning, for investigation or on an open charge all are pro-
hibited by the law. . . . The finger of suspicion is a long one.
In an individual case it may point to all of a certain race, age
group or locale. Commonly it extends to any who have com-
mitted similar crimes in the past. Arrest on mere suspicion
collides violently with the basic human right of liberty. It can be
tolerated only in a society which is willing to concede to its
government powers which history and experience teach are the
inevitable accoutrements of tyranny.2 1
While the jailed defendant may have been constitutionally deprived of his
liberty, he has not lost all his rights. Thus a search of his car or home
without a valid warrant or his consent is clearly illegal.P The right to
refrain from making self-incriminating statements, of course, remains
inviolable.2 The prison authorities may not unduly harass the defendant
nor attempt to destroy his remaining self-dignity. In the words of the
present court, the jailed defendant cannot be forced to become "an active
participant in police investigation, a role which a free man is not required
to assume," 2 inasmuch as his "rights are not different because he is
accused of a crime." 
2 5
Had the court placed its decision entirely on a due process-type "active
participant" rationale, however, it might have hampered police administra-
tion unduly, for that rationale might be interpreted to forbid forcing the
arrested person to submit to "mug" photographs, fingerprints, or any
lineup,26 since all of these investigatory procedures require some degree
of active participation by the accused. The court's failure to consider the
direct relationship of the law of arrest to the present case probably re-
sulted from this consideration and the conclusion that, since the plaintiffs'
freedom had already been lawfully curtailed, their removal from the
custody of the prison authorities without probable cause need not be viewed
as a restriction of their liberty and hence was not an arrest.
2 7
21 Hogan & Snee, The McNabb-Mallory Rule: Its Rise, Rationale, and Rescue,
47 Gao. LJ. 1, 22 (1958).
22 Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); United States v. Arrington,
215 F.2d 630 (7th Cir. 1954).
2 3 Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503 (1963); see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964).
24 Instant case at 567.
2 5 Commonwealth v. Brines, 29 Pa. Dist. 1091 (C.P. Philadelphia County 1920),
quoted in instant case at 567.
26 See Editorial, The Philadelphia Inquirer, Nov. 29, 1964, § 7, p. 4, col. 1. The
validity of these practices has not been seriously questioned. See Caldwell v. United
States, 338 F,2d 385 (8th Cir. 1964); United States v. Kelly, 55 F.2d 67 (2d Cir.
1932); 8 WIcmoRE, EVmENCE § 2265 (McNaughton rev. 1961). PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 1403 (1964) expressly authorizes the police to fingerprint and photograph
arrested individuals.
27An arrest is generally held to be consummated when the individual's liberty
is restricted. E.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 103 (1959).
CASE COMMENTS
On the other hand, the court's utilization of the equal protection clause
could also have vast implications, even though it expressly limited its
holding to the investigatory lineup 2 by stating that the police could bring
victims of crimes to the prison and permit them to view the suspects in
their cells or in the prison yard.29  The police admitted that they do not
use viewings of bailed defendants. 80 Therefore, the court's dictum suggests
that police use of a certain investigatory practice exclusively against jailed
defendants does not render the practice unconstitutional, so long as the
police might constitutionally use it against persons free on bail, even if
police do not in fact do so.
However, equal protection of the laws may be denied a class where
a law or administrative procedure valid on its face is so administered as to
create an invidious discrimination against that class3 1 Once it is deter-
mined that there is an invidious classification, it is immaterial whether the
state action which results in the inequality is due to the state's lack of
legal power to take similar action against members of the favored class
or simply to a decision by the state to refrain from taking such action.
32
In criminal procedure the classification of defendants according to their
ability to pay is generally as invidious a discrimination as one based on
religion, race, or creed.83 Nevertheless, administrative discrimination must
be intentional or purposeful to be constitutionally forbidden,3 4 and even
this showing will not render the classification unconstitutional when it can
be justified as a legitimate exercise of discretion.35 As a rule the police
and prosecutor have broad discretionary power in their conduct of investi-
gations.3 6
28 "[A] preliminary injunction will still leave available to the police opportunities
for observation of [jailed] suspects by complainants which are broader than in the
case of those who are free on bail." Instant case at 568.
29 Id. at 566. Although plaintiff's counsel conceded this point, the court's reliance
upon the active participant rationale indicates that it would arrive at the same result
without the concession.
30 Id. at 567 n.7.
31 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Yick Wo v. Hopkins,
118 U.S. 356 (1886). See generally Comment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory
Enforcement of State Penal Laws, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1103 (1961).
32 See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); People v. Harris,
182 Cal. App. 2d 837, 5 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Dist. Ct. App. 1960).
3 See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956).3 4 Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 8 (1944); Comment, 61 CoLum. L. REV.
1103, 1113 (1961).
A major difficulty that plaintiffs in the instant case, or in like situations, have
to overcome is proving that the police were deliberately utilizing an administrative
procedure which discriminated against them. The problems of proof are substantial
and may in some situations prove to be impossible of solution. However, the courts
should not disregard "and ignore the common knowledge that the system of bail,
based as it is on financial ability, is weighted heavily against the poor." Instant case
at 567-68. For a discussion on the problem of proof and possible approaches which
can be utilized, see Comment, 61 COLUm. L. Rv. 1103, 1122-31 (1961).
35 Cf. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962) ; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
425-26 (1961); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545 (1954).
386 See Comment, 61 COLUm. L. REv. 1103, 1119-22 (1961). See generally Note,
Prosecutor's Discretion, 103 U. PA. L. Ray. 1057 (1955).
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The bail system generally operates so that nonindigents will be bailed
rather than jailed, so a classification of suspects according to whether they
are bailed or jailed will tend to approximate a classification of them
according to whether they are indigent or not. 7 Once it is shown that
law enforcement officials investigating unsolved crimes consciously place
jailed defendants at a distinct disadvantage as compared to bailed, the
burden should be on the state to show that this is a justifiable method of
law enforcement.
38
In determining whether or not a classification is justifiable, the Supreme
Court seems to have balanced the harm imposed upon the individual so
classified with the interest of the state in maintaining the classification. 9
"Absolute equality is not required; lines can be and are drawn and we often
sustain them." 40 However, once the Court has determined that a par-
ticular classification violates the equal protection clause, it has been very
reluctant to approve other inequalities between these same classes.41 Thus
in Griffin v. Illinois,2 the Court held that Illinois, having established a
system of appellate review, could not deprive an indigent of his right to
appeal because he was unable to afford a needed trial transcript.4 3 Since
Griffin the Court has extended the scope of equal protection in order to
afford the indigent an adequate appellate review.
44
The only uniqueness in the present case is the extension of equal
protection to the area of police investigation. 45 The unequal treatment with
which the indigents in the present case were threatened is as significant as
37 See authorities cited note 5 supra.
38 Cf. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Norvell v. Illinois, 373
U.S. 420 (1963) (by implication) ; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
3 9 Note, 16 STAN. L. REv. 394, 399 (1964) ; see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420 (1961); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Compare Norvell v. Illinois, 373
U.S. 420 (1963), with Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), and Eskridge v.
Washington, 357 U.S. 214 (1958).
It has been suggested that the balancing done by the Court in the equal protection
area involves the same determination of "fundamental fairness" as that in due process.
See Douglas v. California, supra at 360-63 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ; Griffin v. Illinois,
rupra at 35-36 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Note, 16 STAN. L. REv. 394, 399 (1964).
Compare Griffin v. Illinois, supra, and Douglas v. California, supra, with Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
40 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) ; see McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420 (1961) ; Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948).
41 See Kurland, supra note 13, at 145-62 (1964). Compare Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962), vith Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and Lucas v. Forty-
Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
42351 U.S. 12 (1956).
43 The extent to which Griffin itself is the result of a balancing process is demon-
strated by the concurring and dissenting opinions of Justices Frankfurter and Harlan.
Id. at 20, 29. Mr. Justice Frankfurter recognized that the holding in Griffin created
a new constitutional right and suggested that it be applied only prospectively. Id. at
25. Mr. Justice Black's opinion, announcing the judgment of the Court, does not
explicitly weigh the harm to the individual against the reasonable objective of the
state. However, such an analysis seems implicit. See id. at 13.
44 See Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S.
477 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington,
357 U.S. 214 (1958).4 5 In People v. Harris, 182 Cal. App. 2d 837, 5 Cal. Rptr. 852 (Dist. Ct. App.
1960), however, it was held that proof that the police were discriminating against
Negroes in the investigation and enforcement of state gambling laws would constitute
a defense to prosecution of Negroes under those laws.
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the inequality under which those in Griffin suffered. Illinois supplied
indigents with free transcripts only in capital cases and cases involving a
constitutional issue. The state attempted to justify its appeals law on
the grounds that it would be a financial hardship on the state to supply
all indigents with trial transcripts, and that it might make matters unduly
difficult for appellate courts to allow appeals without transcripts. But the
state's failure to supply transcripts in Griffin made an appeal impossible for
the convicted indigent. Thus an indigent, unlike a nonindigent, would
probably have to accept the trial court's determination of his case as final.
In the present case the state's justification for the jailed-bailed
classification is based upon its lack of responsibility for the individual's
confinement. The police are using these lineups for the purpose of law
enforcement, certainly an important social end. A restriction on the
investigatory lineup will undoubtedly allow some jailed defendants, who
under current practices would be identified and convicted, to escape ever
being brought to trial.
On the other hand, the rights of indigents, as individuals and as a
class, must also be considered. The Supreme Court's increasing sensi-
tivity to the dangers posed to individual rights by police investigatory
practices has been adequately demonstrated during recent terms.46 In
the present case the state's law enforcement policy would result in identifi-
cations of indigents without corresponding identifications of nonindigents.
On the basis of these identifications, indigents would be more likely to be
brought to trial than corresponding nonindigents. The present injunction
will protect the innocent jailed defendant from an improper identification
as well as the guilty one from a proper identification.
The court was probably aware of the implications its holding would
have if placed solely on grounds of either equal protection or due process
by bringing into question the entire relationship of the arrested individual
to the police. Thus it did its utmost to restrict its holding to these lineups
by stressing the constitutionality of the bail system and the viewings. It
seems to have reasoned that if it would be a violation of due process to
force a bailed defendant to submit to a particular hazard or hardship, then,
and only then, it is a denial of equal protection to subject an indigent
defendant to that hazard or hardship.
However, the justification for unequal treatment in the viewings is
no greater than for the investigatory lineup, and the inequality imposed is
equally significant. Indeed a lineup is simply a viewing of several indi-
viduals at one time with the intention of minimizing the chances of a
mistaken identification. One could hardly think of a more prejudicial
place to view a suspect than in a prison cell. The evil of the police practice
litigated in Butler is not the lineup, but the relegation of the poor to a
place of distinct disadvantage in the criminal process.
46 See, e.g., Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) ; Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201 (1964) ; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
